Flock Safety ALPR
Flock Safety · ALPR Camera
✓ Reviewed
Index
Flock Safety makes the pole-mounted licence-plate-reading cameras fielded by thousands of US police departments and neighbourhood associations. Every passing vehicle is photographed and logged with its plate, vehicle characteristics, a timestamp and the camera location, building a searchable record of where ordinary people drive. Nobody opts in: this is infrastructure pointed at the public, and Flock's own privacy notice says it "cannot verify the identity of individuals whose effects (i.e., license plates) appear in the Footage and are unable to process data subject requests related to such images" - so drivers have no way to see, correct or delete their own records. Flock does have real constraints on paper: plate data is hard-deleted after 30 days by default, the company says it does not sell personal information, its trust pages state the ALPR system does not use facial recognition, and every query is logged with a stated purpose. Independent records show those guardrails failing at scale. EFF obtained logs of more than 12 million searches by over 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025, including hundreds of protest-related lookups where the stated justification was often a single word such as "protest". 404 Media, using public records from Danville, Illinois, documented more than 4,000 nationwide and statewide lookups run for immigration purposes - reasons typed as "ICE", "ICE+ERO" and "ICE WARRANT" - even though Flock holds no contract with ICE. In August 2025 the Illinois Secretary of State's audit found the company in violation of Illinois law, which bars sharing plate data for immigration or out-of-state abortion investigations, after Customs and Border Protection gained access through a Flock pilot the company's own leadership was unaware of; reporting notes the 2023 Illinois statute carries no specific penalties. Leaked internal material also showed Flock building "Nova", a tool that pulls in outside data sources to jump from a plate to a named person without a warrant.
Why this rating
POLICY 38 = 100 -20 no-opt-out (privacy notice: Flock "cannot verify the identity of individuals whose effects (i.e., license plates) appear in the Footage and are unable to process data subject requests related to such images", and asserts its hardware "captures video and images in public spaces where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy" - the surveilled public, who never consented, is given no access, correction or deletion right) -15 law-enforcement-loose (privacy notice permits disclosure to "law enforcement authorities, government officials" on a "good faith belief that such access, use, preservation, or disclosure is reasonably necessary to: (a) comply with a legal process or request"; the LPR policy repeats the same good-faith standard for LPR data and imposes no vendor-side limit on inter-agency sharing, stating only that "Customers choose whether to share LPR data with other customers in accordance with their laws and policies", which is what makes a nationwide lookup network possible by policy design) -8 indefinite-retention (30-day default is bounded, but the LPR policy allows it to be "adjusted case-by-case if customer law or policy requires different schedules", setting no ceiling on the extension) -8 sensitive-collection (privacy notice covers "images, video, and/or audio recordings from your device" and device "geolocation"; sustained location-over-time on non-consenting drivers is inherently sensitive - held to 8 because Flock's trust pages state "Does Flock use facial recognition? No. The ALPR system does not recognize faces or identify people" and that ALPR "does not collect or infer race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or other personal traits") -6 policy-vagueness (categorical claim that "Flock's Footage does not contain Personal Information that connects that image to an identifiable individual" defines the captured public out of the notice's protections) -6 unilateral-change ("Flock may revise this Privacy Notice at any time by updating this posting") -4 broker-disclosure (privacy notice: "we may share Personal Information with third-party advertisers for targeted advertising purposes" and "we may allow third parties to collect Personal Information from Flock Services" - sized small because the clause is qualified by "when authorized service providers have agreed to contractual limitations regarding retention, use, and disclosure" and sits under U.S. State Privacy Laws, reaching website/customer PI rather than plate footage) +5 data-minimization bonus (published default of automatic hard deletion of LPR data on a rolling 30-day basis, plus audit logging of every query including "Purpose of query" and a trust-page commitment that searches "must relate to a specific investigation" and "Every search is recorded" - genuine written constraints most surveillance vendors do not publish). Not applied: sells-data ("Flock does not sell Personal Information"; the LPR policy states customer-owned data and that Flock's own use is limited to "a fraction of LPR images (less than one percent), which are stripped of all metadata and identifying information, solely for the purpose of improving Flock Services through machine learning"). EVIDENCE 18 = 100 -25 regulatory-action (August 2025 Illinois Secretary of State audit sampling 12 local agencies found Flock broke Illinois law by letting US Customs and Border Protection reach licence-plate data, in a state whose 2023 statute bars ALPR data being shared to enforce immigration or abortion-related laws; the office found Flock "did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of", and CEO Garrett Langley conceded "We clearly communicated poorly. We also didn't create distinct permissions and protocols in the Flock system to ensure local compliance for federal agency users"; held at 25 rather than higher because reporting notes the statute "does not contain any specific penalties for violating it" and no fine was imposed) -22 misuse-in-practice (EFF public-records dataset of "more than 12 million searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025" found "more than 50 federal, state, and local agencies ran hundreds of searches" tied to protest activity; the marketed justification control collapsed in use - the reason field is "only a few words--or even just one", "often just 'protest'" - with Beaumont PD reaching "across 1,774 networks" on a "KINGS DAY PROTEST" reason, Spokane County querying 95 networks on "no kings", and Tulsa PD logging at least 38 protest-related searches) -18 law-enforcement-abuse (404 Media, from a Danville, Illinois public-records request, documented "more than 4,000 nation and statewide lookups by local and state police" run at federal request or as an "informal" favour, with reason strings "immigration", "ICE", "ICE+ERO", "illegal immigration" and "ICE WARRANT", despite the fact that "Flock does not have a contract with ICE"; cameras operate in "more than 5,000 communities around the U.S.") -17 undisclosed-collection (internal Flock presentation slides, Slack chats and meeting audio obtained by 404 Media, 14 May 2025, showed the company building "Nova" to supplement plate reads with brokered personal data across "20 different data sources", letting police "jump from LPR to person" and identify and track people "without a warrant or court order" - capability well beyond the marketed vehicle-data-only position, and confirmed by Flock as already in early-access use by agencies). Not applied: breach/CVE (no intrusion into Flock's own systems, published vulnerability, or federal enforcement action appears in the sources reviewed - this evidence score reflects documented misuse and regulator-confirmed unlawful access through the fielded system as designed, not a compromise of Flock). Involuntary system: no member of the public agreed to a policy or can decline capture, but every point above is deducted from a source a reader can open, not from that status.
What it is
- Camera
- Requires a cloud account
- Manufacturer
- Flock Safety
- Category
- ALPR Camera
- Model years
- 2025-2026 (period covered by cited sources)
- Market status
- Current
- Companion app
- Flock Safety cloud platform (agency-facing web dashboard)
The evidence 9
Independent research, regulatory action, lawsuits, breaches and journalism about this device — the "what actually happens" axis. Each links to its source.
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EFF obtained, via public-records requests, datasets covering more than 12 million Flock searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025. More than 50 federal, state and local agencies ran hundreds of searches tied to protest activity, and EFF identified 19 agencies logging dozens of searches associated with the No Kings protests. The search justification field, which Flock markets as its accountability control, was typically a few words or a single one - often just 'protest'. Documented examples include Tulsa PD logging at least 38 protest-related searches, Spokane County Sheriff's Office querying 95 camera networks on a 'no kings' reason, and Beaumont PD reaching across 1,774 networks on a 'KINGS DAY PROTEST' reason. By Dave Maass and Rindala Alajaji.
Why it matters here: Primary basis for the -22 misuse-in-practice evidence deduction; also rebuts the vendor's audit-log/justification control as an effective limit.
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Using a public-records request to the Danville, Illinois Police Department, 404 Media obtained Flock search logs from departments nationwide showing more than 4,000 nation and statewide lookups by local and state police performed at the behest of federal agents or as an 'informal' favour, or with an immigration focus. Officers typed reasons including 'immigration', 'ICE', 'ICE+ERO' (Enforcement and Removal Operations), 'illegal immigration' and 'ICE WARRANT'. While Flock does not have a contract with ICE, the agency sources data from Flock's cameras by making requests to local law enforcement. Flock cameras are in more than 5,000 communities around the U.S. By Jason Koebler and Joseph Cox.
Why it matters here: Primary basis for the -18 law-enforcement-abuse evidence deduction; shows federal immigration access routed through local agencies with no Flock-ICE contract.
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The Illinois Secretary of State's office announced that its audit found Flock Safety in violation of state law after US Customs and Border Protection gained access to Illinois licence-plate reader data. NOTE FOR REVIEWERS: this page could not be loaded during verification - three URL variants on ilsos.gov timed out and the Wayback proxy was unavailable - so it is included on the strength of an archived snapshot confirming the URL resolves, plus verbatim corroboration of its contents by the Wednesday Journal and NPR Illinois items in this record. A human reviewer should open this link before publication.
Why it matters here: Primary regulator source for the -25 regulatory-action evidence deduction: a state constitutional officer's formal finding of unlawful data sharing against the vendor itself, not merely a customer agency.
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Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias' audit, sampling 12 local law enforcement agencies, found Flock Safety broke Illinois law by allowing US Customs and Border Protection agents to access licence-plate reader data. Illinois has laws banning licence plate reader data from being used for immigration status investigations and criminal investigations related to out-of-state abortion access. State officials found Flock 'did not have proper safeguards in place for data sharing, which was compounded by the fact that the company was running a pilot program with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which Flock leadership was unaware of.' CEO Garrett Langley responded: 'We clearly communicated poorly. We also didn't create distinct permissions and protocols in the Flock system to ensure local compliance for federal agency users.' Oak Park had ended its contract on August 5; a Palos Heights account had searched Oak Park data 28 times in January citing 'immigration violation'. By Brendan Heffernan.
Why it matters here: Loaded, verbatim-verified reporting of the Illinois Secretary of State audit findings that anchor the -25 regulatory-action deduction.
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Reports that Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias found Flock 'gave U.S. Customs and Border Patrol access to Illinois data as part of a pilot program' and 'didn't have any safeguards to prevent other out-of-state police from violating Illinois' license plate reader law'. A 2023 state law 'prohibits operators of license plate readers from sharing the data they collect for the purpose of enforcing immigration or abortion-related laws', but the law 'does not contain any specific penalties for violating it'. CEO Garrett Langley said the company had paused all pilot programs with federal agencies. By Andrew Adams.
Why it matters here: Independent corroboration of the regulatory finding while the regulator's own page was unreachable; also supplies the limiting fact that the Illinois statute carries no specific penalties, which caps the regulatory-action deduction at 25.
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Internal Flock presentation slides, Slack chats and meeting audio obtained by 404 Media revealed 'Nova', a product that supplements licence-plate reader data with brokered personal information so police can 'jump from LPR to person'. One Slack message said Nova supports 20 different data sources agencies can toggle on or off, and the tool enables identifying and tracking people 'without a warrant or court order'. Flock told 404 Media the tool is already being used by some law enforcement agencies in an early access program. By Joseph Cox.
Why it matters here: Primary basis for the -17 undisclosed-collection evidence deduction; documents capability beyond the marketed vehicle-data-only scope.
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Flock's own notice states it 'cannot verify the identity of individuals whose effects (i.e., license plates) appear in the Footage and are unable to process data subject requests related to such images', and that its hardware 'captures video and images in public spaces where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy' - leaving the surveilled public with no access, correction or deletion right. It claims 'Flock's Footage does not contain Personal Information that connects that image to an identifiable individual.' It permits disclosure to 'law enforcement authorities, government officials' on a 'good faith belief' standard; reserves the right to 'revise this Privacy Notice at any time by updating this posting'; and covers 'images, video, and/or audio recordings from your device' plus device 'geolocation'. Under U.S. State Privacy Laws it states Flock 'does not sell Personal Information. However, we may share Personal Information with third-party advertisers for targeted advertising purposes, and we may allow third parties to collect Personal Information from Flock Services when authorized service providers have agreed to contractual limitations regarding retention, use, and disclosure of such Personal Information.' Footage is stored in Amazon S3 'for thirty (30) days'. Last updated August 1, 2025.
Why it matters here: Anchors the policy-axis deductions for no-opt-out, law-enforcement-loose, policy-vagueness, sensitive-collection, broker-disclosure and unilateral-change, and the 'Not applied: sells-data' note.
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Flock's LPR policy sets the retention baseline and the sharing architecture: LPR data 'is hard deleted on a rolling 30-day basis by default' and may be adjusted case-by-case if a customer's law or policy requires a different schedule - an uncapped extension clause. Data gathered on behalf of customers 'is owned by the customer', and 'Customers choose whether to share LPR data with other customers in accordance with their laws and policies', with no vendor-imposed limit on inter-agency sharing. Flock may disclose LPR data to law enforcement, government officials and third parties on a reasonable good-faith belief standard. All system queries are stored for auditing purposes including username, date, time, 'Purpose of query', and query elements. Flock states its own use is confined to less than one percent of LPR images, stripped of all metadata and identifying information, 'solely for the purpose of improving Flock Services through machine learning'. Last updated June 30, 2026. Verified absence: this document contains no reference to a 'National LPR Network'.
Why it matters here: Anchors the -8 indefinite-retention deduction, part of the -15 law-enforcement-loose deduction, and part of the +5 data-minimization bonus.
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Flock's trust pages state 'ALPR Does Not Use Facial Recognition. Flock ALPR does not identify drivers or passengers' and 'Does Flock use facial recognition? No. The ALPR system does not recognize faces or identify people.' They also state 'Flock ALPR does not collect or infer race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or other personal traits', that ALPR 'does not assign risk scores or guess who might commit a crime', that 'ALPR system searches must relate to a specific investigation', and that 'Only approved users can access it. Every search is recorded.' These are vendor assertions, and the EFF and 404 Media records in this entry document the search-justification control failing in practice.
Why it matters here: Supplies the only verifiable source for the vendor's no-facial-recognition and no-demographic-profiling claims, which cap the sensitive-collection deduction at 8, and for the recorded-search element of the +5 data-minimization bonus.
Descriptive, cited, not legal advice; ratings are versioned and corrections create a new version. Data from the IoT Info Grabber DB research project, CC BY-SA 4.0.